Increasingly, settlement agreements stipulate effectiveness 10 upon the entry of a bar order containing specific provisions, which often supplement those provided by the PSLRA. 11 Yet, in considering whether to approve a settlement, the court must consider the effect of the settlement as a whole, and is not free to modify, substitute, or delete the provisions of requested orders. 12 In addition, courts generally may not consider an appeal of a bar order separately from the entire settlement. . Furthermore, the court concluded that "review of testimony at various congressional hearings fails to uncover any discussion which would shed light on the specific purposes behind the contribution bar, beyond those apparent from the plain language." Id. at 17 n.1.
10. See Bendis, 36 F.3d at 923 (holding that the court can only agree to the judgment credit method stipulated in the settlement agreement and that "if the court orders some other credit, there is no settlement"). 12. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir. 1992); see also In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that it is not the function of the court to modify the terms of settlement as proposed by the parties); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the settlement must stand or fall as a whole); In re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 257-58 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that the court will not substitute its business judgment for that of the parties, but will determine whether the proposed settlement is within a range of reasonableness).
13. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 494-95 (holding that " [w] here the parties have stipulated that the bar order is integral to the settlement, this court may not consider the order in isolation" and that settling defendants may have waived their rights to object to the order). However, should the court disapprove the settlement, it may notify the parties of the objectionable provisions and instruct the parties what must be done to gain court approval. In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., A provision augmenting the PSLRA bar, which is often sought by settling parties, is a bar on all claims for indemnification.
14 Prohibiting indemnification claims surpasses the PSLRA because, although the PSLRA directs the court to bar certain claims for contribution, 15 the Act is silent on indemnity. Undeterred, numerous courts have entered orders barring claims for indemnification, reasoning that although the PSLRA directs the court to bar contribution claims "in the first instance," the statute should not be read to foreclose the entry of a broader order. 16 Courts note that neither the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 17 nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 18 provide indemnity rights, and federal precedent generally regards indemnification as inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of the securities laws. 19 Thus, a bar on indemnification claims is proper.
Unsettled is whether bar orders may prohibit indemnification claims made under state corporation law, 20 as well as so-called "independent" claims premised on, for example, tort or contract theories. 21 If successful, "independent" claims would reallocate the liability of a settlement (or judgment) to another party. Because the liability of a settlement is a precondition to the "independent" claims (as the li- 14 . See cases cited infra notes 42-71, 91-111 (referencing numerous cases involving requests by settling parties for a bar on all claims seeking indemnification).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A) (2000) . 16 . In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 726, 727 n.29; see also infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Pa. 2001 ) (holding that concerns over the potential viability of independent state law claims should not inhibit the approval of an otherwise acceptable bar order and that the "the issue of whether certain particular claims are covered by any bar order we issue is properly for another court to decide").
ability of a settlement establishes a completed tort claim or breach of contract claim), allowing a party to raise state law claims premised on the same facts underlying the settled federal securities action arguably permits an end run around a settlement agreement and/or an indemnification bar. 22 For this reason, a minority of courts refuses to recognize independent claims, and instead regards independent claims as "de facto claims for indemnification" 23 and "nothing more than claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in wording." 24 Yet, the majority of courts have concluded that tort-or contract-based claims are legally distinct from contribution and indemnity claims, because such claims require proof of specific elements, such as duty, breach, causation, etc. 25 This Note outlines the scope of bar orders entered in federal securities fraud settlements. After reviewing the PSLRA bar, this Note analyzes the uncertain purview of an indemnification bar, before considering the courts' contrasting treatment of independent claims. Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting that where satisfied securities fraud liabilities are premised on a compensatory policy, both indem- 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A) (defining "knowing commission" as "an untrue statement of a material fact, with actual knowledge that the representation is false" or an omission "to state a fact necessary in order to make the statement made not misleading, with actual knowledge that, as a result of the omission, one of the material representations of the covered person is false"). Reckless conduct is not classified as a "knowing commission." Id. § 78u-4(f)(10)(B Corollary to these express contribution rights, the PSLRA sets forth a bar on contribution claims in 10b-5 actions that settle prior to trial. 33 In addition to discharging the settling party from all obligations to the plaintiff arising out of the action, the PSLRA directs the court to enter an order discharging the settling party from all claims for contribution made by other parties. 34 Furthermore, the PSLRA bar has been held to prohibit claims for contribution made under other sections of the federal securities laws where contribution rights otherwise would exist. 35 The bar is bilateral in prohibiting contribution claims made against settling parties as well as contribution claims that may otherwise belong to a settling party. 36 The bar may extend to preclude pendant state law contribution claims that are "integrally related" 37 or "arise out of" the settled federal securities claims.
38
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7): A covered person who settles any private action at any time before final verdict or judgment shall be discharged from all claims for contribution brought by other persons. Upon entry of the settlement by the court, the court shall enter a bar order constituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling covered person arising out of the action . . . .
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A)(i) (declaring the order effective against all future claims for contribution arising out of the action "by any person against the settling covered person"). The PSLRA's move to proportional responsibility (for most defendants) limits the practical effect of the statutory bar, as the move to proportionate responsibility eliminates contribution rights otherwise available to jointly and severally liable defendants paying more than their fair share.
35 In Lucas, which preceded the Cendant holding, the court specifically addressed only whether state law claims for contribution are barred under section 21D(f)(7) of the PSLRA. 18 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35. However, the Cendant court held that section 21(D(f)(7)'s language that "all future claims for contribution arising out of the action" should be read broadly, and to the extent that a claim is "integrally related" to the securities claim settled, all contribution claims that arise out of that action are barred. 139 F. Supp. 2d at 593. The court found that the parties did not dispute that a claim under section 11
To eliminate prejudice that a joint and severally liable nonsettling defendant might incur as a result of having its contribution rights eliminated, 39 the PSLRA contains an offset providing that any judgment subsequently obtained against nonsettling parties shall be reduced by the greater of (1) an amount corresponding to the settling party's percentage of responsibility, or (2) the dollar amount paid by the settling party. 40 Insofar as the offset is held to encompass pendant state law claims, the PSLRA essentially codifies the single recovery rule in 10b-5 actions. 41 
II. INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

A. Indemnification Is Generally Prohibited under the Federal Securities Laws
Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, court approval of securities fraud settlements frequently included orders barring indemnification claims made by or against settling parties.
42 The reasoning supclaim was integrally related to a section 10(b) claim, as the two claims "arise out of practically the exact same factual environment and require nearly identical proofs." Id. In Fromer, the court maintained that the Second Circuit in Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), "suggested" that indemnity claims could proceed under the Exchange Act where the wrong committed by the indemnitee "is no greater than ordinary negligence." See 50 F. Supp. 2d at 238 n.8 (declaring that the Second Circuit had not adopted the view of other circuits that indemnification is "simply unavailable under the federal securities laws" and had dismissed such cases on the grounds that there the parties "all shared fault to some extent"). Perhaps noting the court's departure from federal precedent in finding an implied cause of action for indemnity under the federal securities laws, Judge Scheindlin reasoned that the combination of (1) the Supreme Court's holding in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993) , that federal courts have authority to imply a right to contribution under section 10b-5, and (2) Congress's recognition of the judiciary's "authority to shape, within limits, the 10b-5 cause of action," provided the necessary authority to imply a cause of action for indemnity under Section 10b-5. See id. at 238-39 (stating that because "the 10b-5 action was not created by Congress, but was implied by the judiciary . . . . it would be unfair to those against whom damages have been assessed for the courts to now disavow authority to allocate that liability on the theory that Congress has not addressed the issue directly"); see also id. at 238 (noting that "a judicial finding of liability" was precluded because the original action had settled and the statute of limitations on related actions had run, leaving an admission as the only manner on which to base a finding of liability, thus "'[p]laintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to prove that they were without fault and are therefore entitled to indemnity' under federal securities laws") (quoting Greenwald v. Am. Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
Indemnity between Securities Act violators is rare. Whether an issuer may obtain indemnification from Section 11 liabilities arising from either (1) an underwriter's or dealer's fraud (e.g., "spinning" and "laddering"), or (2) the allocation of shares in an IPO and aftermarket tiein agreements, should be regarded as an open area of law. Compare In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 740 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that "[t]hose courts that have permitted indemnification have done so only if the party to which the loss is shifted is one 'significantly more liable for the injury to the plaintiff' but declining to reach whether a party "may ever" be is no statutory right to indemnification under either the Securities Act or Exchange Act, 45 and courts almost 46 unanimously refuse to read implied indemnity rights into either Act because "[p]ermitting indemnity would undermine the statutory purpose of assuring diligent performance of duty and deterring negligence."
47 Courts refuse to enforce indemnification agreements because "to tolerate indemnity . . . would encourage flouting the policy of the common law and the Securities Act," 48 as indemnification agreements allow a party to shift its entire liability to another before allegations of wrongdoing surface and a determination of fault is made, undermining the federal policy of full disclosure and Congress's intent to protect the public (particularly unsophisticated investors) from fraudulent practices. 49 have held that indemnity from federal securities law liabilities is unavailable as matter of law, 50 such that indemnification is prohibited both without regard to a party's degree of fault 51 and at times even where a party's conduct is wholly without fault. 52 However, an alternative to an absolute prohibition on indemnity is to permit indemnification from liabilities incurred in connection with a statute's compensatory purpose. 53 Insofar as section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is applied to compensate defrauded investors, 54 pri-50. E.g., In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. at 622 (dismissing indemnity claims because (1) customer agreements can allow for indemnification of federal securities law liabilities only to the extent of implied indemnity rights, (2) there are no implied indemnity rights under the federal securities laws, and (3) parties cannot contractually create or expand a right to indemnity under the federal securities laws where none exists).
51. See Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 484-85 (noting that "[a] number of federal courts have held that this policy against allowing indemnification extends to violations of sections 11 and 12(2), where the underwriter is merely negligent in the performance of its duties"); Baker, 876 F.2d 1101 at 1108 (declaring that "Congress has not provided a right to indemnification in the federal securities law under any circumstances").
52 vate or equitable reallocation of 10b-5 liability may not offend remedial policy so long as an investor class is made whole. In contrast, where a statute's underlying policy is deterrence, indemnity offends. For instance, the Securities Act's registration process endows various participants with select duties each inuring to the benefit of the investing public. 55 Allowing a party to absolve itself of liability through private ordering undermines the Securities Act's design. Failing to recognize the disparate policies, courts have blurred the underlying policy of the Securities Act with sections of the Exchange Act into an overarching scheme that operates to prohibit indemnification of any securities fraud liability under the broad umbrella of the federal securities laws. 56 Since the PSLRA's enactment, courts have continued to issue settlement bar orders extinguishing all indemnity claims. he fundamental problem is that while the Exchange Act was under consideration, there was very little debate over section 10(b) and no substantial opposition to it," because "the Exchange Act was not the product of normal circumstances"). The broad remedial policy of Section 10(b) may be served differently depending upon the identity of the party and the nature of relief sought; thus, although the Court held that scienter is an essential element of a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation regardless of whether the suit is a private action for damages or an injunction enforcement action brought by the SEC, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980), the Court also noted that the Second Circuit's reasoning highlights the compensatory function of Section 10(b) in private actions: "the two types of suits under § 10 (b) advance different goals: actions for damages are designed to provide compensation to individual investors, whereas suits for injunctive relief serve to provide maximum protection for the investing public." Id. at 686 n.3.
55. See Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 ("Civil liability under section 11 and similar provisions was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement of the Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those who fail in their duties." 57. See infra notes 58-64, 108-11, and accompanying text.
Parties objecting to indemnity bars have argued that post-PSLRA bar orders should be limited to the specific provisions of the Act. 58 Because the PSLRA sets forth a particular contribution bar, parties have argued that by omission the Act precludes settlement orders from barring indemnification claims. 59 This argument was rejected by the court in In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation, 60 which held that the PSLRA does not "implicitly adopt" prohibitions that preclude a court from entering an order barring indemnification claims. 61 The court reasoned that no provision in the Act explicitly limits a court's ability to enter an order barring indemnification, and nowhere states that "the order therein described" is the solitary order that courts may entertain. 62 Moreover, the PSLRA was enacted against "a background of prior decisional law under which orders barring indemnification claims had been entered," a history that "militates against a finding that the PSLRA could implicitly adopt a prohibition of the practice." In holding that the PSLRA does not specify the sole bar order available in securities fraud settlements, the court was careful to emphasize that its decision in no way "extended" the provisions of section 78u-4:
[T]he PSLRA does not identify a single particular mode of bar order, but instead merely directs the court to bar certain contribution claims. We do not read § 78u-4 as attempting exhaustively to detail each and every action that a district court is permitted to perform in conjunction with a securities action settlement and thereby to forbid all other actions.
. . .
[O]ur holding does not serve to 'extend' the PSLRA in the first instance. Rather, while we do read the PSLRA as positively requiring one form of release-namely, the bar on contribution actions-we do not see this as constituting language that 'limits' the nature of the bar order to only that form.
Id. at 727 n.29. 63. Id. at 727. Although the court declined to approve the settlement because a certain protective offset provision contained in the settlement agreement was omitted from the proposed order and the agreement lacked a reciprocity provision barring the released tortfeasors from
Other courts considering the issue have similarly refused to interpret the PSLRA as limiting a court's discretion to enter a broad order. 64 Yet, where parties stipulate to a settlement containing a bar order only to the extent required by law, the PSLRA simply requires a contribution bar. 65 In such circumstances, the PSLRA bar has been interpreted to preempt state law claims styled as contribution claims, but no more.
66
B. Preemption of State Law Indemnity Claims
Courts have held that under an order barring indemnification claims, state law indemnification claims that are coextensive with settled federal securities law claims are preempted as a matter of law.
67
Preempted state law actions may stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," 68 although it is "well settled that federal law does not enjoy complete preemptive instituting actions against the nonsettling defendants, the court eagerly extended Eichenholtz to post-PSLRA actions. See id. at 729-30 (stating that the language of the bar order in question "is materially identical to the provisions approved in Eichenholtz"). The court's reasoning was clear on its face: because the provisions of the PSLRA in no way effect an indemnity-preclusion analysis, the "indisputable breadth" of Eichenholtz is undiminished by the PSLRA. the common law counts pendent to the federal securities claims" the appellants' state claims for indemnity based upon negligent failure to investigate and discover fraud and breach of fiduciary duty could be recognized depending on which state's law was to be applied and the resolution of unresolved factual issues as to the relationship between the parties).
71 . 1969) ). The court held that "[i]f, on the other hand, plaintiffs [sic] state law claims are sufficiently independent of the federal securities claims-although admittedly related to them as they 'arise out of' the federal claims-this Court will not bar [the defendant's] right to seek indemnity under state law." Id. The result in Lucas was that the court refused to enter the proposed bar order because it assumed that "at least one claim for indemnity" may be pursued that would not be based on federal securities law. Id. ments. 72 Bylaws providing for D&O indemnification and/or exculpation are usually authorized (or required) to a limited extent under state corporation law. 73 Federal courts have generally permitted indemnification of officers and directors who successfully defend, or admit no fault in settling, securities fraud claims. 74 The Securities and Exchange Commission has noted its support for indemnification of outside directors under these circumstances as well. 75 Yet, the cloud of 72 . See supra note 20 (listing sources that discuss the tension between corporate indemnification bylaws and the federal policy prohibiting indemnity from securities law liabilities). Settling officer-directors who are protected by indemnification/exculpation clauses may attempt to carve out an exclusion to an order barring indemnification claims. When officers and/or directors are nonsettling parties, the scope of an indemnity bar would be of great concern. In such situations, courts must determine whether the federal common law policy barring indemnification preempts state corporation law. See infra notes 67, 74.
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001) (permitting and, in some instances, requiring Delaware corporations to indemnify directors, officers, and others for expenses incurred in a wide variety of legal proceedings).
Section 145(c) of Delaware's code provides that a corporation must indemnify directors and officers who have been successful on the merits or otherwise in any defense of an action covered by section 145(a) or 145(b). Under section 145 (a) and 145(b), a corporation may indemnify its directors (including officers, employees, and agents) for attorneys' fees and other expenses that arose in connection with their capacity as directors (if their conduct was in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation), and for judgments rendered against directors, or amounts paid in settlement of civil cases in third-party actions by directors. Section 145(f) permits a corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than those set forth in section 145, unless those rights are contrary to the limitations set forth in section 145, other statutes, court decisions, or public policy. a settlement bar order prohibiting indemnification claims may obscure the enforceability of D&O indemnification agreements. As Judge Posner once remarked, "the federal common law" policy determining the liabilities inter se of violators of the federal securities laws "would seem" to have negative implications for the merits of state claims in state actions. 76 And although courts enforcing D&O indemnification agreements normally limit preemption to instances where a director's or officer's wrongdoing is admitted or "has been plainly adjudicated," 77 this exception to the federal policy has not always been afforded to lower corporate officials. 78 Such inconsistency emphasizes a need to revisit the federal "prohibition" on indemnity.
A second and more nuanced split in the federal policy on indemnification was created by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge. 79 In Baker, the court dismissed with prejudice a plaintiff's state law statutory indemnification claim as
In the Commission's view, outside directors provide important protections for public investors in corporations generally and particularly where companies are financially troubled. Indemnification for costs incurred in the defense of the good faith exercise of their business judgment is an appropriate and necessary expense in order to attract qualified persons to serve in that capacity. [T]he Commission has long been dissatisfied with the idea that officers, directors, and other persons controlling an issuer might be indemnified by the issuer for Securities Act liability. The Commission's position is that such indemnity is against public policy and, therefore, it believes that any provision granting it is unenforceable.
See also id. § 4:2.2 DELAYING AND ACCELERATING EFFECTIVENESS (stating that the threat to deny acceleration is the tool the Commission uses to enforce this viewpoint). Thus, when an issuer requests acceleration of a registration statement containing indemnity provisions, "the Commission requires that the issuer include in its registration statement an undertaking to submit the public policy question concerning indemnification to a court test before paying any such indemnity." Id. preempted under federal law, 80 but dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff's pendant common law actions for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract, leaving it up to the state courts to classify whether these actions were preempted "de facto claims for indemnification." 81 The Fourth Circuit did not define what claims constitute "de facto" indemnity claims. 82 This omission caused a split regarding what state law claims constitute de facto indemnity claims, which claims are independently viable, and how the assertion or potential assertion of independent claims affect the entry of a broad settlement bar order.
III. "INDEPENDENT" CLAIMS
Federal courts have split on whether settlement bar orders may extinguish state law causes of action-often based in tort or contract law-that arise out of settled claims. 84 Courts have expressed three viewpoints. The first view holds that a broad order extinguishes all claims made by or against settling parties that seek to recover the liability of a settlement. Courts adopting this view reason that the intimate relation of "independent" claims to the settled securities claims transforms the "independent" claims into quasi-indemnification and/or contribution actions. 85 Thus, the claims may be barred. The second (majority) view supports orders barring contribution and indemnification, but holds independent claims of nonsettling parties beyond the scope of settlement bar orders. 86 Barring independent claims is improper as independent claims require proof of different elements and are fundamentally distinct from contribution and indemnification actions. 87 claims raised subsequently by settling parties. 88 Yet these courts sometimes disagree on whether independent claims may recover damages that are "measured by" federal securities law liabilities. 89 The third view holds that courts may approve settlements stipulating to broad bar orders and refrain from issuing advisory opinions on whether the order precludes potential independent claims. 90 This view permits the court to free itself of complex litigation via settlement and avoid a contentious determination of how broadly the terms of a bar order should be construed.
A. View #1: Independent Claims May Be Barred
The most widely cited decision supporting a bar on "independent" state law claims is the Eleventh Circuit's holding in In re United States Oil and Gas Litigation. 91 There, a third-party plaintiff insurance company sought damages against a broker and another settling defendant on fraud and negligence theories 92 "to the extent that it [was] liable to any of the plaintiffs [(i.e., the court appointed receiver and investor class)] herein." 93 The court held a settlement bar order 94 effective against the "independent" causes of action, declaring that the fraud and negligence claims were "nothing more than claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in wording." 95 The court stated there was "not a shred of logic upon which we could base 88 a principled distinction between bar orders against contribution, on the one hand, and orders against indemnity or so-called 'independent claims,' on the other." 96 The court reasoned that [t] he propriety of the settlement bar order should turn upon the interrelatedness of the claims that it precludes, not upon the labels which parties attach to those claims. If the cross-claims that the district court seeks to extinguish through the entry of a bar order arise out of the same facts as those underlying the litigation, then the district court may exercise its discretion to bar such claims in reaching a fair and equitable settlement.
97
The court stated that the dispute was not "one of those rare instances where a cross-claim unrelated to defendants' liability to the plaintiffs has somehow remained." 98 Moreover, the court questioned "whether truly independent claims that a settlement bar order cannot extinguish will ever remain in a class action lawsuit."
99
The Eleventh Circuit quoted a flowery opinion from the District of South Carolina 100 where nonsettling defendants were viewed as having cloaked indemnification claims in fraud and contract parlance, prompting that court to opine, "a rose by any other name is still a rose." 101 The South Carolina National Bank 102 court rejected nonset-96. Id. at 495. This aspect of the holding was explicitly rejected by the courts in Lucas and Cendant. Lucas held that although it had not reached the merits of the claims for indemnity as did the Court in U.S. Oil and Gas, "[t]o the extent . . . that In re Oil and Gas may be read as standing for the proposition that there generally is 'no principled distinction' between claims for contribution and claims for indemnity, the Court disagrees and rejects its holding." Lucas v. Hackett Assoc., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 101. In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 496 (citing S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C. 1990)). The "rose by any other name is still a rose" metaphor first originated in a different decision that also rejected the validity of independent claims under a comprehensive settlement bar. In Greene v. Emersons, the independent cross-claims by a defendant accounting firm against two individual corporate defendants were for fraud, conspiracy to violate legal rights, and interference with business relations including inducing breach of contract. 1, 1983 ). The court held that if the independent claims were construed as indemnification claims "the cross-claims must be dismissed" because "[n]o action for indemnity exists between partici-tling defendants' objections that a proposed bar order 103 improperly prohibited their intended cross-claims for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud, 104 in a settlement of alleged 10b-5 violations, violations of South Carolina's securities laws, and various common law theories. 105 The South Carolina Nat'l Bank court reasoned that because damages would arise only if the nonsettling defendants were found liable to the plaintiffs, "these purported causes of action are nothing more than claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in wording." 106 The court added that as an equitable remedy, claims for contribution entail no right to a jury trial, and as for the indemnification claims, "as the Court has previously noted, claims for indemnification as between co-tortfeasors are not cognizable under Rule 10b-5 or common law." 107 More recently, Neuberger v. Shapiro 108 entered a broad bar order 109 over the objections of nonsettling defendants, who argued that pants in a fraudulent scheme prohibited by the federal securities laws." Id. at 97,271. The court declared that "stripped of labels, verbiage, and conclusory allegations" the "independent" claims were "no more than efforts to cast upon [the individual corporate defendants] the entire ultimate responsibility for the damages alleged by plaintiffs," although had the claims asserted "independent damage . . . . of a different nature" that the accountant had suffered directly, the court implicated that an independent claim might exist. Id. at 97,272 (noting that because the accountant failed to plead damage apart from the settlement, "I am not in a position to determine whether or not [the accounting firm] is actually in a position to assert provable damages separate and apart from its potential liability to the plaintiffs"). The court rejected the accountant's attempt to substitute litigation costs and related inconveniences, citing the American Rule on fee shifting. Id. The Non-Settling Defendants in general . . . contend that they have 'independent claims' against the [settling defendant] which are neither for contribution or indemnification. It appears to this court that without plaintiffs suing the non-settling defendants the 'independent claims' of the Non-Settling Defendants would not exist and that these claims are really nothing more than claims for indemnity.
107. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 749 F. Supp. at 1433. The court added that should it be determined that defendants are entitled to a jury trial, the proposed bar order would not infringe on that right because it directed the Court to determine judgment reduction methods "in accordance with principles of law, and equity and procedures then applicable" which would necessarily include a jury trial, if proper. Id. the order impermissibly barred future state law claims. 110 The court in Neuberger reached the potential state law claims and rejected them as untenable on numerous grounds, including preemption.
111
B. View #2: Independent Claims May Not Be Barred
A second view holds that independent claims are based upon separate wrongs, so that they survive settlement orders extinguishing contribution and indemnification rights. 112 The leading case, Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 113 is more commonly known for establishing the "imputation" doctrine. 114 Yet Cenco also held that a codefendant auditor could state a cross-claim, distinct from an indemnity 109. The bar order provided in pertinent part:
All parties to the Litigation are permanently and forever barred and enjoined from filing, commencing, instituting, prosecuting or maintaining, either directly, indirectly, representatively, or in any other capacity, any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, thirdparty claim or other action arising out of the Settled Claims and/or the transactions and occurrences referred to in the Plaintiffs' Complaints (including, without limitation, any claim or action seeking indemnification and/or contribution, however denominated) against [the settling defendant accounting firm] or any of the Released Parties, whether such claims are legal or equitable, known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued.
Id. at 381. 110. Id. at 383. 111. Id. at 383-84 ("Inasmuch as those cross-claims arise out of the . . . defendants' alleged liability under the securities laws, they are pre-empted and, therefore barred as a matter of law."). The various other grounds on which the court relied in rejecting the nonsettling defendants potential claims were: (1) as part of the settlement, the plaintiffs had agreed to indemnify the released parties for any judgment that the nonsettling defendants obtained against the released parties, a provision the court found protected the nonsettling defendants, id. at 382-83; (2) because of certain set-off provisions and indemnity agreements contained in the bar order, any recovery on independent grounds "would be duplicative," id. at 384; (3) in their individual capacities the defendant directors and officers possessed no breach of contract action against the accounting firm, id. at 383-84; (4) claims for professional negligence were dismissed because under Pennsylvania law, "any claim . . . for substandard performance . . . is in reality a claim for indemnification or contribution," id. at 384.
112. Courts recognizing a distinction between independent claims and indemnification and/or contribution claims have either permitted independent claims to proceed notwithstanding comprehensive bar orders, or have expressly excluded independent claims from the order's ambit. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 730-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the nonsettling defendant CEO's separation claims and the CEO's and CFO's defamation claims were clearly beyond the scope of the order); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1306, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that an auditor's independent state law tort and contract claims, along with cross-claims by other parties, could continue to be prosecuted against a settling law firm as they were left unaffected by the bar order).
113. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982). 114. Id. at 454-56 (holding that a wrongdoing corporation whose senior management has engineered a fraud may not assert justifiable reliance on an otherwise innocent outside auditor who failed to discover and expose it).
claim, against a corporation for the corporation's fraud against the auditor.
115 In separating claims for common law fraud and breach of contract from indemnity, Judge Posner considered "the distinction . . . a fine one." 116 The codefendant auditor portrayed itself as a victim on the state law theories rather than as a wrongdoer seeking indemnity. 117 The court held that the existence of the settlement was relevant to the auditor's tort claim because it established impact: without the settlement the alleged wrongdoing would be inchoate. 118 Should the auditor prove the codefendant issuer "defrauded it into issuing false audit reports which in turn exposed it to liability to the class plaintiffs, the amount it paid to settle with the class would be a permissible item of damages."
119
The subsequent history is instructive. On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the defendant corporation moved for summary judgment on the state law claims, arguing that any fraud by the company had not been the proximate cause of the auditor's "voluntary" $3.5 million settlement. 120 The district court declared that the issue was not whether the auditor settled, but whether the company's fraud was a proximate cause of the auditor's liability to the class. 121 Later, when the corporation renewed its motion for summary judgement, the district court further explicated why the auditor's claim was not a veiled attempt at indemnification: . After being dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction, the auditor pressed its claims for fraud and breach of contract in state court, though the merits of the auditor's independent claims were left unresolved because management settled as Thus, the auditor's tort claim provided an avenue to recovering the securities fraud settlement that was not premised on a right to payment, but upon the company's alleged commission of a separate wrong against the auditor.
123
After Cenco, a number of courts have either explicitly or implicitly accepted aspects of its analysis. 124 Two of these cases are helpful in illustrating different approaches courts have taken regarding the extent securities law liabilities may be recovered on independent claims.
The first case, In re Sunrise Securities Litigation 125 followed Cenco in its construction of a bar order entered to protect a settling law firm from contribution and indemnification claims arising from a settlement of a failed savings and loan.
126 When a nonsettling auditor brought claims against the law firm for intentional misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and tortious interference, the law firm attempted to persuade the court that the auditor's claims (as well as claims made by other nonsettling parties) were in effect "de facto indemnity claims" barred by the court's order and federal precedent.
127
In holding that the independent claims survived the settlement bar order, the court reasoned:
This case is similar to In re Cenco. The damages that the non-settling defendants seek for their tort and contract claims are similar, although not identical, to the damages that they seek for their indemnification claims. Such an overlap does not necessarily transform the claims into claims for implied indemnity. 130 the Alvarado court responded to concerns of repackaged pleading by declaring that "any state claim, however denominated, which seeks indemnity, may be extinguished through dismissal." 131 Thus, an auditor's cross-claims for contractual indemnity were barred because of the "overriding federal concerns at issue." 132 In considering the nonsettling defendants' state law claims for breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, the court relied upon Cenco in upholding the validity of independent claims, but departed from Cenco by initiating an inquiry into the measure of damages:
[T]o the extent non-settling defendants seek damages . . . measured by its liability for violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts, such claims may be extinguished. However, to the extent damages may be claimed beyond those sought for violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts, such claims are independently viable pendent state claims, and while, in my discretion, I may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction, I may not "extinguish" them. 133 Thus, although both of these approaches hold that independent claims may not be entirely barred, Alvarado departs from Cenco by focusing on the measure of damages rather than on the nature of the claims asserted. 134 Parties concerned that damages on independent theories might be restricted may note that permissible items of damage-apart from judgments or settlements paid to third parties-have included the costs of defending actions filed by third parties and by the clients, insiders, and/or shareholders themselves, 135 as well as business-related damages such as loss of business opportunities, harm to reputation, and loss of goodwill. 136 Temptation to measure damages continues to capture courts otherwise following Cenco. In a recent $3.2 billion settlement 137 between a consolidated class, a corporation, and an auditor, 138 the court in In re Cendant Corporation Securities Litigation 139 dismissed a corporation's contribution claims, 140 but refused the auditor's motion to dismiss the corporation's claims for common law fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. 141 The court held that although the state law claims arose out of the settled claims, 142 they were "independent, non-indemnity claims that are neither barred nor preempted by the federal securities laws." 143 The court refused the auditor's motion to certify for interlocutory appeal whether the PSLRA bar precludes a defendant from seeking "contribution" under independent state law theories. 144 Though the court cited Cenco in holding that an overlap in damages did not "automatically convert the state law claims into impermissible contribution claims" 145 or indemnity claims, 146 the court nevertheless highlighted that the company's alleged damages for diminished value of the company and lost business opportunities went "beyond recovery of [the amount] paid in settlement."
147
C. View #3: Whether Independent Claims May Proceed Should Not Inhibit Entry of A Comprehensive Bar Order
The final view holds that courts may approve settlements stipulating to broad bar orders and decline on Article III grounds from conclusively determining the order's ambit. 148 The In re Rite Aid Securities Litigation court held that concerns that the instant settlement order impermissibly barred potential independent claims were premature, 149 and whether a future action would be precluded as "'based upon, arising out of or relating to' the Settled Claims" was a determination for whatever future court hears the potential claims based on "applicable state or federal law,"
150 "made on a case-by-case basis."
151
Although the Rite Aid court refused to issue an advisory opinion on the validity of certain potential claims, 152 the court held that some classes of claims were excluded from the scope of the bar order. First, nonsettling officers' potential insurance and indemnification claims, as well as the outside auditor's possible claims against the corporation for fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and breach of contract, were not necessarily beyond the order's purview, but were "exactly the sort of claims" on which the court found itself prevented from ruling. 153 However, the court was more decisive in dealing with the nonsettling CEO's separation claims, as well as the CEO's and CFO's defamation claims, which the court ruled were clearly beyond the scope of the order. 154 
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Before suggesting how courts should regard indemnity and independent claims when entertaining broad bar orders, it is necessary to note that the Cendant court's thorough treatment of the issue was limited by a stipulation of settlement requesting an order extending only so far as the PSLRA requires. 155 Yet, in considering the scope of any order, the PSLRA's terms should be regarded as a floor. Although the Cendant court limited its bar order to the specific provisions set forth in the PSLRA, it acknowledged that a bar on independent claims was permissible under "pre-existing federal common law."
156 Unlike the settling parties in, e.g., Bendis, Oil & Gas, Alvarado, and Rite Aid who requested an order barring related state law claims in addition to contribution and indemnification claims, the settling parties in Cendant purposefully excluded any language from the legal issues are not sufficiently defined to permit adjudication. That is, while we may know the outlines of these asserted rights and claims from the non-settling defendants' descriptions of them in their briefing, this level of knowledge is not sufficient for us even to determine whether they would in fact be barred by the language of the proposed bar order, much less whether they are the sort of claims that are legally permitted to go forward in the wake of the partial settlement of a securities action.
Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
153. See id. at 731 (holding that it was "for future courts considering these claims to assess the application of the Bar Order to them. . . . '[i]n accordance with otherwise applicable federal and state law'" (quoting proposed bar order)). 156. See id. at 6 ("The Court appreciates that several pre-PSLRA cases held that the imposition of a contribution bar, which might in certain circumstances encompass state law claims, was permissible and fair in light of the federal policy in favor of settlement of securities suits.").
settlement agreement which would have barred independent claims. This point colored the Cendant decision: [ The company] and [the auditor] sought the entry of settlement bars only to the extent required by the PSLRA and no further; each sought expressly to reserve its rights to assert any and all claims against the other, to the fullest extent allowed by law. . . . [The auditor] cannot have it both ways. It cannot disavow the language which was extensively and intensively negotiated by arguing that those claims should be considered to be encompassed by the PSLRA's contribution bar because of the pre-existing case law which simply said that bars against state law claims would be permissible. 157 Indeed, the parties had stipulated that the company would remit to the class one half of any recovery it might obtain against the auditor following the settlement, a provision that the court found to be "an implicit acknowledgement that [the company] had the right to pursue some related claims against [the auditor]."
158 Thus, to hold that the PSLRA bar precludes independent claims would have provided a windfall to the auditor by providing it rights for which it had not bargained.
Ordinarily, the decision whether to enter an order barring related state law claims and/or indemnification claims will be difficult. Although the majority of courts have glossed over the issue, to some extent the question remains whether the court has the power to bar noncontribution claims of third parties. 159 Where such claims are merely potential, courts may consider following Rite Aid by issuing a broad bar order, while leaving the construction of the order's scope for a later court to determine at a later time when independent claims coalesce. 160 In the right circumstances, Article III abstention can sweep a docket of complex litigation and avoid a contentious legal determination.
Yet, underlying courts' conflicting viewpoints on the validity of independent claims, there exists a tension between the sound legal footing on which independent claims stand and the reality that, if suc-157. Id. at 8. 158. Id. 159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Although the possibility remains that, where the court refuses to enter a comprehensive bar order, settling defendants can include indemnity/hold harmless provisions in the settlement agreement having effects similar to judgment set-off mechanisms, see, e.g., supra notes 5 & 111, such extra-judicial agreements will rarely be as desirable, comforting, or convenient as a bar order entered from the bench.
160. See supra Part III.C.
soning supporting a bar on indemnification claims disappears. 168 Indeed, courts sanction D&O indemnification under these circumstances. 169 Finally parties seeking to recover federal securities law liabilities on independent theories should consider alleging damages distinct from a securities settlement, cognizant that independent damages tend to be regarded favorably. 170 Courts may look to nontrivial independent damage as a screening device to prevent parties from leveraging state law claims with speculative or contrived damages against an otherwise protected settling party. 171 The mere recognition of independent claims can extend enormous leverage to a moving party based upon the sheer dollar amounts typically at issue. 172 Thus, pleading independent damage, although not technically required, may be desirable.
CONCLUSION
Four points should be considered in weighing the scope of bar orders sought in federal securities fraud settlements. First, the court is see also supra note 53 (noting that courts have been careful to prohibit indemnity based on a scienter requirement rather than on federal precedent).
168. Arguably, the PSLRA's adoption of a proportionate fault regime necessarily vindicates parties either lacking or substantially free of fault from liability that is attributable to another, rendering full indemnification superfluous. ) ("And this Court has already rejected the conclusion of Oil & Gas that there is really no distinction between a contribution claim and one which seeks recovery under a different theory, particularly when, as here, the claim seeks to recover other types of damages as well.").
172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting $3.2 billion settlement at issue in Cendant).
required by statute to enter a bar on certain contribution claims. Second, the court must only consider provisions extending beyond the statutory contribution bar if petitioned to by the settling parties. Third, a bar on indemnification claims is generally consistent with federal precedent. Fourth, it is unsettled whether independent claims that seek to recover securities liabilities may (1) be barred as "de facto indemnification claims"; (2) recover limited damages; or (3) are beyond the purview of settlement bar orders. More likely to survive even broad bar orders are state law claims that either allege damages distinct from settlement and litigation costs incurred, or maintain complete innocence so as to paint the moving party as a victim rather than as a cotortfeasor.
